WTM’S PIRATE PLAYER PROFILES

Allie presented substantial risks when he was drafted.  He was a good prospect as a power-hitting thirdbaseman and pitched only a little before his senior year, so he had unusually limited experience.  A lot of his focus was simply on lighting up the radar guns and he had little control in the early part of his senior season.  His draft status picked up when he started showing better command.  The Pirates’ selection of Allie inevitably drew speculation that he was just a fallback in case they failed to sign first-round pick Jameson Taillon. The Pirates, however, made it clear from the start that they intended to sign both and, in the end, they did. As expected, it took until the last day of the signing period, with Allie accepting a $2.25M bonus to pass up a scholarship to North Carolina.

2011
A-:  0-2-0, 6.58 ERA, 1.89 WHIP, 26 IP, 10.0 BB/9, 9.8 K/9 

The Pirates sent Allie to State College to start the season.  In retrospect, it may have been an overly ambitious assignment.  His first few starts went alright, but the control problems surfaced and he had some outings where he just couldn’t get anything over.  After seven starts the Pirates had him pitch in relief.  He ended up walking 29 in 26 innings, and added nine hit batsmen and seven wild pitches.  On the positive side, he fanned a lot and opponents hit only .208 against him.  It may not mean anything given the small sample size, but left-handed batters hit .341 while right-handed batters hit .096.  He also was much less likely to walk righties.  His fastball sat in the 93-95 range, which is realistic given the need to gain better command.

2012
A:  0-1-0, 54.00 ERA, 13.50 WHIP, 0.2 IP, 108.00 BB/9, 13.5 K/9

R:  213/314/340, 150 AB, 6 2B, 2 3B, 3 HR, 21 BB, 50 K, 2-2 SB

Allie was throwing much better in spring training, although his control still was a problem.  The Pirates sent him to West Virginia to open the season and it was a disaster.  In two outings he managed to retire only two batters while walking eight, hitting one and throwing three wild pitches.  The Pirates sent him back to extended spring training and things did not improve.  The team eventually had him start playing two ways in exhibitions, which led to a mutual decision to move him off the mound, a move that the team announced on the eve of the 2012 draft.

This was obviously not good news.  Allie was at least a mid-1st-round talent as a pitcher.  As a hitter, Baseball Prospectus has characterized Allie as a 3rd to 5th round talent.  His hitting skills mirror his pitching:  he has prodigious power, but swings and misses a lot.  The Pirates sent him to the GCL, where he initially played third.  After he committed eight errors on just 30 chances, the team moved him to first, although he also served as DH a lot.  He showed good power and a willingness to take a walk, but he struck out in a third of his ABs.  When the GCL Pirates reached the playoffs, which they eventually won, Allie didn’t play.  The team instead used Eric Wood at third and Edwin Espinal at first.

The Pirates appear to have lost their gamble with Allie, but doesn’t mean it was a bad gamble, as some of the more unthinking elements of the blogosphere treated it.  He was universally regarded as an extremely risky prospect, so the very strong possibility that he wouldn’t work out as a pitcher was always present.  The move to hitter is an understandable attempt by the team to retrieve something from their investment, although they’re vulnerable to the criticism that they should have tried longer with Allie on the mound.  It’s impossible to know for sure, though, what exactly transpired in extended spring training leading up to the decision, although it’s clear at this stage that Allie wasn’t fully committed to being a pitcher, and especially not a starting pitcher.  Hopefully, given the chance to settle in and focus on hitting, he’ll start making better contact.  He’ll open 2013 at West Virginia as the starting first baseman.